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Abstract
A new communications environment, driven largely by the Internet and World Wide Web, is rapidly changing
the economic, social, and political landscape. According to recent surveys, nearly seven in ten Americans (68
percent) now use computers at least "occasionally," six in ten (59 percent) have computers in their homes, and
more than half (55 percent) have access to the Internet, 43 percent of these from home. Of the 55 percent of
Americans who are "wired," more than one-third (36 percent), or 20 percent of the general public, now go
online five or more hours per week. These numbers are up significantly from just a few years ago. For example,
the number of Americans who say they go online at least occasionally has increased from 21 percent in 1996
to 54 percent in 2000.
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The Internet and an Informed
Citizenry
MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI AND SCOTT KEETER
9
AiNEW COMMUNICATIONS environment, driven largely by theInternet and World Wide Web, is rapidly changing the eco-omic, social, and political landscape. According to recent sur-
veys, nearly seven in ten Americans (68 percent) now use computers
at least "occasionally," six in ten (59 percent) have computers in their
homes, and more than half (55 percent) have access to the Internet,
43 percent of these from home. Of the 55 percent ofAmericans who
are "wired," more than one-third (36 percent), or 20 percent of the
general public, now go online five or more hours per week. These
numbers are up significantly from just a few years ago. For example,
the number ofAmericans who say they go online at least occasionally
has increased from 21 percent in 1996 to 54 percent in 2000.1
Although much of this increased Internet traffic is devoted to
work, entertainment, and/or personal consumption, the Web has also
become an increasingly important source ofnews (see table 9.1). One-
third of Americans (33 percent) report going online for news at least
one day per week, nearly one-fourth (23 percent) at least three days
per week, and 15 percent every day. Although the Internet is not yet
a predominant news source for campaigns-in February 2000, only 7
percent ofcitizens reported that the Internet was one of their top two
sources for campaign news (up from 2 percent in 1996)-nearly one-
fourth (24 percent) said they "regularly" or "sometimes" learned
something about the presidential campaign or candidates from the
Internet.2
The civic potential of the Internet is especially strong among
younger Americans. For example, one recent survey found that 70
percent of18- to 25-year-olds believe the Internet is a "useful" source
of political and issue information (compared to 48 percent of those
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Table 9.1 Patterns of Computer and Internet Use among the U.s. Public
September April-May July February April-May
1996 1998 1999 2000 2000
Computer use 56 61 67 67 68
Goes online 23 36 52 52 54
Goes online for news:
At least once per week 8 20 29 25 33
At least 3-5 days per week 4 13 19 16 23
Every day 1 6 12 9 15
Getting most of your news about
the presidential campaign from
... (1-2) responses accepted):
Television 75 73
Newspapers 44 33
The Internet 2 7
Source: Surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press.
over 25), outstripping television news, newspapers, radio, magazines,
personal conversations, and direct mail. 3
As Internet use has increased, newspaper readership and television
news viewing has declined. The percentage ofAmericans reporting
that they "regularly" read a daily newspaper fell from 71 percent in
1990 to 63 percent in 2000. Larger declines have occurred in the reg-
ular watching ofnational television news broadcasts (from 60 percent
in 1993 to 30 percent in 2000) and 10cal1V news (from 76 percent
to 56 percent). Even regular cable news viewing has declined, from as
high as 30 percent in 1990 to 21 percent in 2000. Online news sites
(CNN.com, ABCNews.com, MSNBC.com, etc.) are consistently
rated as more believable than their broadcast or cable equivalents.4
Greater Internet use has coincided with increased availability of
news and political information on the Web. All of the national broad-
cast and cable news networks have web sites, as do most local affiliates
and major newspapers. Campaign web sites are becoming the norm
for national and statewide candidates and are also increasingly com-
mon in races for local offices. One would be hard-pressed to find a
federal or state government office, or office holder, without a public
web site. And the number of both nonpartisan and advocacy groups
that have an Internet presence is large and growing. 5
There is little doubt that the way citizens consume political and
public affairs information is changing. Less clear are the implications
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of this transformation for the practice ofdemocratic politics. Whether
the emerging information environment will be little more than "old
wine in new bottles," will further erode the already less than optimal
state of civic life, or will usher in a new, more participatory citizenry
and responsive government remains an open question. In this chapter
we explore the potential impact ofthe Internet on a specific but crucial
element of democratic citizenship: political knowledge. In the next
section we briefly summarize the current state of political knowledge,
making the case for why an informed citizenry is an important requi-
site for a well-functioning democracy. We then turn to a discussion of
the qualities of the Internet that could potentially affect citizens' abil-
ity to learn about politics, offering some data to suggest a relationship
between Internet use and political knowledge today. Finally, we con-
clude by speculating on the ways in which the Internet (and its future
incarnations) might be used to increase Americans' political knowl-
edge.
What Americans Know about Politics
and Why It Matters
Several decades of research provide fairly compelling evidence for five
conclusions regarding what Americans know about politics: (1) the
average American is poorly informed but not uninformed; (2) average
levels of knowledge mask important differences across groups; (3)
most citizens tend to be information generalists rather than specialists;
(4) knowledge is a demonstrably critical foundation for good citizen-
ship; and (5) little change has occurred in any of these tendencies over
the past fifty years.
The American Public Is Underinformed
but Not Uninformed
One of the most common conclusions drawn from survey research is
that citizens are poorly informed about political institutions and proc-
esses, substantive policies, current socioeconomic conditions, and
important political actors such as elected officials and political parties.6
For example, in an assessment of more than 2,000 survey questions7
tapping factual knowledge of politics, the average level of knowledge
was low: more than half of those surveyed could only answer four in
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ten of these questions. Similarly, in a fifty-question test covering a
range of topics designed to tap knowledge of three key areas (institu-
tions and processes, current issues and social conditions, and key polit-
ical actors and groups), the average score for a national sample of
American adults was about 50 percent correct. 8
Among the questions that less than halfof the public could answer
were many facts that seem crucial to effective citizenship, including
definitions ofkey terms such as liberal and conservative, knowledge of
many rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and where candidates,
parties, and public officials stood on important issues of the day. Yet
although the public can be characterized as poorly informed, it is not
uninformed. Majorities demonstrated knowledge of rudimentary but
potentially important facts such as the meaning of the presidential
veto, key civil rights such as the constitutional guarantee to a trial by
jury, the positions ofpresidential candidates and political parties on at
least some of the major issues of the day, social and economic condi-
tions such as the existence of a budget deficit or surplus, and the like.
Average Levels of Knowledge Mask
Important Differences across Groups
Although the mean knowledge level is low, the variance is high: there
are dramatic differences in how informed Americans are. For example,
on the fifty-question political knowledge test mentioned above, the
most informed 30 percent ofthe sample averaged better than seven in
ten correct answers and the least informed 30 percent could only
answer one in four questions correctly.9 In short, there is no single
portrait of the American citizen: a substantial percentage is very
informed, an equally large percentage is very poorly informed, and the
plurality ofcitizens falls somewhere in between.
One could argue that we should naturally expect "some distribu-
tion across people and across issues of the cognitive demands of self-
government" and ultimately that civic life must "integrate citizenry
competence with specialized expert resources. "10 The problem with
this view is that differences in knowledge parallel other, more tradi-
tional, indicators of political, social, and economic power. For exam-
ple, fully three-quarters of women in a 1989 survey had knowledge
index scores below the median for men. Substantially more than
three-quarters of Americans from families earning less than $20,000
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per year scored below the median for those earning more than
$50,000, as was the case for post-baby boomers when compared to
pre-baby boomers. And three-quarters of black Americans scored
below the twenty-fifth percentile of white Americans, a knowledge
gap of dramatic proportions. II Similar patterns are found in other
studies. 12 These group differences reflect the combined consequences
ofmany factors, including systemic differences in educational achieve-
ment; social location; employment; motivation to follow politics; and
the extent to which efforts are made by political actors to mobilize
people to political action.
Citizens Tend to Be Information
Generalists Rather than Specialists
One might argue that low and inequitably distributed aggregate levels
of political knowledge are not incompatible with the existence of a
myriad of distinct "issue publics." This version of the pluralist model
of civic engagement posits a population of numerous well, but nar-
rowly, informed issue publics that collectively ensure a healthy democ-
racy. Although there are reasons to suspect that citizens focus their
attention on issues of personal concern and so, collectively, would be
informed about different aspects ofpolitics, the evidence suggests that
to the extent citizens become informed they do so across a wide spec-
trum of issues and topics. I3
That most citizens are political generalists rather than specialists is
consistent with what researchers know about the information environ-
ment and news gathering habits ofthe public over the past several dec-
ades. Most citizens do not read the elite newspapers that provide
extensive coverage and so facilitate the acquisition of selective,
detailed, in-depth information. Moreover, most television (the pre-
miere source of political information for most citizens) provides rela-
tively homogenized and surface-level information on current politics.
As a result, the population is better described as general information
haves and have-nots rather than as a collection ofselectively informed
issue publics.
Knowledge Is Tied to Many Attributes of
Good and Effective Citizenship
Evidence of systematic differences in political knowledge, especially
when tied to other socioeconomic indicators of political power,
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should give one pause. The significance of these knowledge gaps
depends, however, on whether or not knowledge matters to effective
citizenship. Although there is some disagreement on this, our own
work and our reading of the larger literature strongly suggests that
informed citizens are "better" citizens in a number ofways.
Specifically, research has found that better informed citizens are
more accepting ofdemocratic norms such as political tolerance; more
politically efficacious; more likely to be interested in, follow, and dis-
cuss politics; and more likely to participate in politics in a variety of
ways.14 Research also suggests that informed citizens are more likely
to have opinions about the pressing issues of the day,15 to hold stable
opinions over time,16 and to hold opinions that are ideologically con-
sistent with each other.17 They are also less likely to change their opin-
ions in the face ofnew but tangential or misleading information18 but
more likely to change in the face of new relevant or compelling infor-
mation.19
There is also evidence that political knowledge affects the opinions
held by different socioeconomic groups (for example, groups based
on race, class, gender, and age differences). More-informed citizens
within these groups hold opinions that are both significantly different
from less-informed citizens with similar demographic characteristics
and arguably more consistent with these citizens' materia1.20 For
example, informed women are more supportive of government pro-
grams designed to protect women's rights, informed but economically
disadvantaged citizens are more supportive of government programs
designed to provide jobs and improve their standard of living, and so
forth. These group differences are large enough to suggest that aggre-
gate opinion on a number ofpolitical issues would be significantly dif-
ferent and more representative of the public interest were citizens
more fully and equitably informed about politics.21
Finally, political knowledge increases citizens' ability to consis-
tently connect their policy views to their evaluations ofpublic officials
and political parties as well as to their political behavior. For example,
more-informed citizens are more likely to identify with a political
party, approve of the performance of office holders, and vote for can-
didates whose policy stands are most consistent with their own
views.22
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Liffle Change Has Occurred in These
Pafferns over the Past Fifty Years
Although data allowing for a systematic comparison ofknowledge lev-
els over the past 50 years are less comprehensive than one would hope,
the evidence strongly suggests that the mean level of knowledge
among Americans is about the same today as it was fifty years ago.23
Similarly, the knowledge gap between men and women, whites and
minorities, and rich and poor is no narrower now than it was several
decades ago, and there is some evidence that the gap between older
and younger Americans has widened.24
The lack of change in the mean level of knowledge can be seen as
good news or bad news, depending on one's perspective. The good
news is that, despite concerns over the quality of education, the
decline in newspaper readership, the rise ofsound bite journalism, the
explosion in national political issues, and the waning commitment to
civic engagement, citizens appear no less informed about politics today
than they were half a century ago. The bad news is that despite an
unprecedented expansion in public education, a communications rev-
olution that has shattered national and international boundaries, and
the increasing relevance of national and international events and poli-
cies to the daily lives ofAmericans, citizens appear no more informed
about politics today.
The relative stability in levels of political knowledge should not be
mistakenly interpreted as suggesting that Americans are unable to
monitor changes in the political environment, however. There are
many examples of significant learning by the public. For example, as
the Republican and Democratic parties differentiated themselves on
the issue of civil rights in the 1960s, public perceptions of their posi-
tions tracked the changes. In the early 1960s, the public was divided
on which party was more committed to civil rights. By the late 1960s,
the public (correctly) perceived the Democrats as more liberal on this
issue by a five-to-one margin.25
Theorizing about the Internet'5 Potential
Impact on Political Knowledge
Given the stability in aggregate levels of political knowledge over the
past half century with such dramatic changes in the information envi-
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ronment, we might expect the introduction ofa new form ofcommu-
nications to have little impact on this aspect of citizenship. However,
the Internet and other digital technologies are different enough from
the past to warrant a closer look.
Although more than ten years old, the work ofAbramson, Arter-
ton, and Orren provides a useful summary of what is new about the
"new media" environment.26 Specifically, they identify six core prop-
erties: (1) greater volume of available information (and reduced cost
of both distributing and receiving information); (2) greater speed in
the gathering, retrieving, and transmitting of information; (3) more
control by consumers in what they receive; (4) greater ability ofsend-
ers to target their messages to specific audiences; (5) greater decentral-
ization ofthe media; and (6) greater interactive capacity.27 How might
these properties affect citizen knowledge? As even a brief exploration
suggests, it is not hard to see why theorists are ofseveral minds regard-
ing the likely impact of the Internet.
Below, we explore several scenarios regarding the potential conse-
quences of the Internet for the level, distribution, structure, and use
of political knowledge in the United States. Using survey data from
several recent studies of the public conducted by the Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press, we also offer some initial evidence
regarding the plausibility of these scenarios.28
Changes in the Aggregate Levels of
Knowledge?
The most optimistic scenario is that the Internet will help increase the
mean level of knowledge while not exacerbating (and perhaps even
reducing) existing gaps in knowledge across socioeconomic groups.
This view is based on the assumption that the availability of informa-
tion is a key determinant in how informed citizens are. Since 1997, 14
trillion megabytes ofinformation have been put on the Internet, with
the volume growing daily.29 This wealth of information provides
unparalleled opportunities for citizens to access political information
ofalmost any kind from a variety ofsources. In theory, greater volume
(and thus opportunity to access information) should translate into a
more knowledgeable public.
In addition, it is possible that interest or motivation can more easily
be translated into political knowledge in this new information envi-
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ronment. Research suggests that people are more likely to learn about
politics if information is available when it is most relevant to them.30
The Internet goes even further than television in its ability to draw
public attention to breaking issues and events (for example, the entire
American public had online access to the Independent Counsel's
report on the Clinton scandals less than an hour after Clinton himself
received it) and does so in a way that combines television's visual and
oral cues with the benefits of textual information. Citizens can literally
play the role ofnewspaper editor or news producer, determining what
information they receive, how much they receive, and when they
receive it. As citizens are more likely to learn about politics when they
are interested or motivated, this greater control can mean greater
knowledge. And even though most citizens are generalists rather than
specialists, interest and learning about a particular aspect of politics
could serve as a gateway into the world of politics more generally,
eventually leading to a more informed public overall.
Just as the Internet offers greater control to consumers, it also
offers producers the ability to gather data on consumers' interests and
habits and to use these data to reach large audiences with higWy per-
sonalized messages. This increases the likelihood that citizens will
receive information of interest or relevance, thus furthering the likeli-
hood of political learning. Given the incentive of information produ-
cers to reach new and larger audiences, it is also likely that, over time,
citizens would be exposed to new messages that are related (but not
identical) to topics in which they have already shown an interest, thus
slowly expanding their knowledge base. Similarly, greater interactivity
and greater decentralization provide opportunities to be exposed to
information and points of view that differ from one's own, sparking
new interests that in turn can lead to seeking new information.
A second and perhaps equally plausible scenario would predict a
general decline in levels of political knowledge, however. In this view
the Internet serves to divert the public from things political-a giant
box of chocolates that lures citizens away from the nourishing food
they need. We know that at least some political learning occurs
because citizens are exposed to political information in the course of
daily life, even if they do not seek it out. To the extent that the new
information environment provides greater opportunities to avoid poli-
tics, such passive learning is less likely to occur. In addition, it becomes
less likely that citizens will be exposed to the kinds ofnew information
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that, by sparking a new interest or piquing one's curiosity, can lead to
political learning. The increasing dominance of commercial over civic
interests on the Internet may further erode levels of knowledge as
politically relevant information becomes increasingly less available rel-
ative to nonpolitical information. And Internet-driven declines in the
opportunities and need to directly interact with other citizens in pub-
lic spaces (especially with citizens different from oneself) could further
erode the kind of community bonds that lead to political interest and
thus to political learning.31
Both of these scenarios assume increased penetration of the Web.
Although this may be a safe ass'umption, it is by no means assured,
especially in the short run. Although there is a clear upward trend in
use of the Internet for news and political information, the percentage
ofindividuals going online has been relatively stable over the past year,
as has computer use overall. Technological changes such as increased
bandwidth, smaller and more ergonomically comfortable computers,
and the convergence of television and the Web may increase the pace
of Internet use-but a simple projection from current trends suggests
that growth in the population ofonline users is slowing down.
Regardless oftrends in overall use, current data suggest that people
who go online for news are better informed than those who do not.
Evidence for this can be found in a 1999 survey by the Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press. On an eight-point knowledge
index (including familiarity with the candidates for the Democratic
and Republican presidential nominations), those who reported going
online for news every day received an average score of5.5, while those
who never went online averaged 4.2, a difference as large as that found
between whites and blacks or between men and women. Other Pew
surveys with different measures ofknowledge show similar differences
between Internet users and nonusers. Internet use remains a signifi-
cant predictor ofpolitical knowledge even when we control for demo-
graphic and political differences among users and nonusers.
We cannot conclude from this finding that the Internet causes
greater knowledge, but it is clear that greater knowledge and extensive
use of the Internet for news gathering and greater knowledge go
together. Thus, we might assume that the mean level of knowledge
for the citizenry as a whole will increase as more citizens use the
Internet. But will the benefits be spread across the full spectrum ofthe
public as the Internet achieves greater penetration? The evidence for
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this is mixed and appears dependent on the interaction between
opportunity, motivation, and ability.
Increases in Knowledge Gaps?
Political learning occurs when citizens have the ability, motivation,
and opportunity to do it. 32 As noted above, the Internet provides
unprecedented opportunities to access information and so should
continue to increase overall levels ofpolitical knowledge among those
who go online. But is opportunity alone enough to increase political
knowledge? In the case of traditional mass media (print and elec-
tronic), there is at least some evidence to support this. For example,
research conducted in Virginia demonstrated very dramatically that
residents of the Richmond area (where state politics is regularly cov-
ered in the local media) were significantly more informed about state
political leaders and issues than were residents of other" parts ofVrr-
ginia where such news was less readily available. The differences were
especially large when Richmond was compared to the northern Vir-
ginia media market, where the media must divide their coverage of
local and state issues across three major jurisdictions (Virginia, Mary-
land, and the District of Columbia). These differences were demon-
strable even after controlling for a broad range of factors known to
affect political learning.33 In short, the information environment
affected aggregate levels of knowledge regardless of citizens' interest
or ability to learn.
But it is not clear that there is an appropriate analogy between the
Richmond and northern Virginia media markets and the comparative
opportunities to learn about politics provided by the pre-Internet and
current information environments. For example, although it is now
quite easy for a resident of northern Vrrginia to use the Internet to
learn what is going on in state government (by looking at the web
sites ofthe Richmond-based Times-Dispatch or the Norfolk Virginian
Pilot, both of which devote considerable attention to state politics),
there is little reason to think. citizens will be exposed to this informa-
tion unless they have the motivation and ability to actively seek it out.
Most likely, both passive and active learning occurs with Internet
use. If this is correct, we would expect citizens who go online for news
to be somewhat more informed than those who do not. But we would
also expect online users who are motivated to follow politics (and so
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news is negatively associated with political knowledge. In the absence
of motivation, more time spent on the Net--even in the pursuit of
news-is associated with holding less knowledge ofthe type measured
here.
This evidence suggests that the Internet, at least in its current form,
is an excellent information resource for people who are motivated to
gather information about politics. Those individuals are apt to benefit
greatly from access to and use of the Internet. To the extent that they
learn more about politics, the mean level of knowledge in society will
rise. But it is equally clear that although less-motivated individuals
may also benefit from use of the Internet, at best these gains will be
less dramatic, increasing the gap between information haves and have-
nots. The rising tide may not lift all boats equally.
Two additional qualities ofthe Internet as it is currently configured
seem particularly likely to exacerbate this tendency. The first is that
although the cost of retrieving information on the Internet is small,
the cost (financial and psychological) of entry to the Internet remains
nontrivial. The second (and in the long run more important) quality
is that with greater volume and fewer gatekeepers come greater costs
associated with organizing and finding relevant information, and these
Figure 9.2. Attention to politics, online news gathering, and political knowledge
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Figure 9.1. Attention to politics, online news gathering, and political knowledge
more likely to fully exploit the Internet's resources) to learn more than
those who are less motivated.34 That is, we would expect to see an
interaction between motivation and going online.
The 1999 Pew Research Center survey provides confirmation of
this pattern. Paying more attention to government and politics is asso-
ciated with significantly higher levels of knowledge about the presi-
dential candidates (both prominent and obscure) and other facts in
the news. Similarly, going online for news is associated with higher
levels ofsuch knowledge as well (even taking account ofdemographic
differences between those who go online and those who don't). But
knowledge levels rise more steeply for Internet users than for nonusers
as attention to politics rises (figure 9.1).
Among young citizens-those aged 18-29-the interaction is
even stronger (figure 9.2). In fact, the interaction between going
online for news and paying attention to politics is the strongest single
predictor of political knowledge. As the figure shows, among respon-
dents who follow politics "most ofthe time," those who go online for
news daily score a full point higher (on an eight-point scale) than
those who never go online. Indeed, among those who say they pay
attention to politics "hardly at all," increased use of the Internet for
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costs will be more difficult for poorer, less educated, and less politically
experienced or motivated people to meet. This notion, often referred
to as the "knowledge gap hypothesis," has been well documented for
other forms of mass media35 and is likely to be especially relevant to a
medium as inherently complex as the Internet.
For example, the leading Internet search engines select sites
through algorithms (based on fees paid by the sites; popularity as
determined by number ofvisitors; institutional and financial intercon-
nections between search engines, portals, and sites; keywords imbed-
ded within particular sites; and so forth) that can lead to an
overwhelming number of "hits," the majority of which are irrelevant
or only tangentially related to the information being sought. At the
same time, no single search engine is thought to reach more than 16
percent of the sites actually on the Internet. 36 One study found that
one in five web pages is twelve days old or younger.37 As research sug-
gests that most users seldom go further than the first few sites that are
called up by search engines, much ofthe power of the Internet can be
lost. Effectively navigating this complex environment can put a pre-
mium on interest and ability, exacerbating existing differences in
knowledge based on socioeconomic differences. This gap will also be
increased by the likely tendency of political information producers
(candidates, news outlets, interest groups) to target their messages to
those citizens who are most likely to respond.
As is well known, the Internet audience is considerably more afflu-
ent and educated than the general public. Figure 9.3 shows the per-
centage of individuals of different levels of educational achievement
who report going online for news at least three days per week. The
figure illustrates a very strong association between education and
Internet use for news, with those who have some graduate school
experience nearly four times as likely to go online for news as those
who only finished high school. But the figure also suggests that the
association between educational achievement and online news gather-
ing was usually as strong or stronger in 2000 as it was a year earlier.
The pattern for income, race, and gender is similar: The gaps in
Internet use for news between rich and poor, black and white, and
men and women are as large now as a year ago. Indeed, a statistical
analysis that takes account of many different demographic influences
on online news gathering in 2000 (using age, income, education, race,
and gender) produces virtually identical results in nearly every respect
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Figure 9.3. Online for news at least 3 days per week
to the same model using 1999 data. If socioeconomic characteristics
were becoming less critical in affecting who surfs the Internet for
news, we would expect to see these characteristics' importance in such
a model decline between 1999 and 2000, but this does not occur.
One comparison between 1999 and 2000 goes against the grain
of our other findings, however. Figure 9.4 shows the percentage of
respondents ofdifferent ages who report going online for news at least
three days during the past week. (Each data point in this graph is an
average of results from individuals covering a five-year age span. For
example, the entry for 30-year-old respondents averages data from
respondents who are 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32 years old. This technique
is called a five-year moving average and helps to smooth out fluctua-
tions in the trend line that result from sampling error and other ran-
dom sources. ) At least two conclusions are readily obvious. First is that
in both years of the survey, younger individuals were more likely to
report going online for news than were older respondents. The second
is that although increases between 1999 and 2000 can be seen for
most age groups, the greatest growth in online news gathering is
among citizens under age 35.
Figure 9.5 shows the age-related trend for regular use ofnewspa-
pers and television news in 1998 and 2000. The pattern is just the
opposite. Older citizens are much more likely to use these media, and
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the younger citizens evidence a larger falloff in use between 1998 and
2000. Taken in combination, figures 9.4 and 9.5 suggest that the pat-
tern ofnews consumption for younger Americans is changing dramat-
ically, but the growth of online news use may not be a harbinger of
greater political awareness among younger cohorts: online news use
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may simply make up for what is lost in the use of more traditional
media.38
We do not have adequate data to examine possible changes in the
"knowledge gap" over time, but taking account of growing Internet
use, we did examine the gap in 1999, comparing those who gather
news on the Internet with those who do not. In comparisons of men
and women, blacks and nonblacks, and younger and older citizens on
the knowledge index described earlier, we found the knowledge gap
to be no narrower among those who used the Internet for news than
those who did not. This was true whether or not we controlled for
other demographic characteristics such as education, income, and
attention to politics.
The Growth of Information Specialists?
A third possible impact of the new information environment is to dis-
courage the kind of information generalist quality that currently char-
acterizes informed citizens. The Internet's greater volume coupled
with greater consumer control, targeting, and decentralization will
allow citizens to focus on the specific levels of politics (e.g., local,
national, international) and substantive issues (e.g., abortion, the
environment, the economy) in which they are most interested. Once
chosen, producers of information are likely to give these consumers
more and more of the same, creating very different information envi-
ronments for different segments of the public. The deliberative, inter-
active aspects of the Internet will only serve to reinforce this
fragmentation as citizens self-select or are exposed to only those chat
groups or other venues that are frequented by like-minded people.
Gary Selnow suggests that this fragmentation carries dangers for a
political system that is otherwise built on a consensus ofviews among
a popular majority ofvoters. One such danger is that citizens will miss
issues that occur outside of their particular surveillance patterns. The
second is that citizens will "run the risk of an information blind spot
within an issue when they chase down sites given to partisan and ideo-
logical viewpoints."39
But increased specialization may not inevitably be bad for the sys-
tem if the specialized knowledge gains are in addition to a continued
pattern of general surveillance. Moreover, to the extent that the
Internet helps previously uninvolved citizens develop an interestin
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specific issues, this could serve as a gateway to more general political
interest (and thus general political knowledge) as they come to feel
more connected to the system and more politically efficacious.
We are much too early in the life of the Internet to say with any
certainty where the path ahead is leading. But some preliminary indi-
cators are suggestive of trends. A Pew Research Center survey con-
ducted in 2000 asked respondents which is more important: "getting
news that gives you general information about important events that
are happening, or getting news that is mostly about your interests and
what's important to you." Two-thirds (67 percent) of respondents
preferred general news, but 28 percent wanted information relevant
to their personal interests. Figure 9.6 shows the relation between this
question and going online for news. As the chart indicates, heavy
Internet news consumers are only slightly less likely to want general
news-at least for now. And though younger respondents were a little
more likely than others to want news of specific relevance to them,
there was no clear pattern of increased interest in personalized news
among the heaviest users of the Internet in this age group.
The other datum of relevance to this question pertains to the
potential displacement of other media by the Internet. If Internet
users are less likely to read newspapers or watch television news, the
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Figure 9.6. Prefer news that gives general information about important events
rather than news about your interests
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agenda-broadening benefits of those media may wane. The 2000 Pew
survey asked online news seekers if they were using other sources of
news more or less often than before (only those going online for news
at least one to two days per week were asked this question). Overall,
58 percent said there was no change in their use of other media, but
10 percent said they were using other media more often, and 18 per-
cent reported using other media less often, with television and news-
papers accounting for most of the loss. But, as might be expected,
displacement was most likely to occur among those who go online the
most. Among those who gather news every day on the Internet, 28
percent said they were using other sources less often.40
The Consequences of Political
Knowledge: The Marriage of Information
and Action?
A final consideration is how the Internet might affect the relationship
between political knowledge and citizenship. Political knowledge and
political action are strongly linked in the literature on participation,
and so any impact of the Internet on levels of political knowledge of
the sort discussed above should translate into changes in the amount
and type of participation. In addition, however, the Internet has the
potential to affect the strength of the link between information and
action either by easing the ability to participate or, in contrast, by pro-
viding opportunities for pseudopolitical activities that have no impact
on the political process.
It is unclear whether the Internet, as presently configured, will pro-
mote conventional forms of political participation. Bimber's analysis
of 1996 and 1998 National Election Study data on participation sug-
gest that the only demonstrable linkage thus far is between Internet
use and financial contributions to campaigns in 1998.41 We may rea-
sonably guess that this connection has been strengthened since 1998,
if for no other reason than that contributions via the Web were illegal
in that election cycle.
Despite the apparent lack of impact to date, the Internet's most
unique characteristics-the marriage of increased information, target-
ing by providers, filtering and active self-selection by consumers, and
bidirectionality ofcommunication-seem to offer truly new prospects
for civic engagement. In particular, the Internet's ability to provide
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information to a citizen and simultaneously permit him or her to act
on that information (e.g., by communicating a reaction to friends,
interest groups, or public officials; giving money; signing a petiti.on;
registering and voting; joining an organization; agreeing to attend a
meeting; etc.) is a radically new feature of the information environ-
ment.
Although the Internet's value for increasing civic engagement has
only begun to be exploited, there is suggestive, if anecdotal, evidence
of its potential. For example, it appears that the Internet was critical
to organizers ofthe Seattle protests against the World Trade Organiza-
tion, to the anti-land mine campaign, and to the Free Tibet move-
ment. Bimber provides two additional examples of mobilization via
the Internet: a national campaign on homeschooling and a local issue
involving the homeless in Santa Monica, California.42 He describes
this general phenomenon as "accelerated pluralism," arguing that the
Internet will not change the basic logic ofpluralism. Citizens will con-
tinue to participate in politics and be mobilized largely through
groups to which they belong. At the same time, Bimber writes, the
Internet "will lower the obstacles to grassroots mobilization and orga-
nization by political entrepreneurs, activists, and others, and will speed
the flow ofpolitics. Lower costs oforganizing collective action offered
by the Net will be particularly beneficial for one type of group: those
outside the boundaries of traditional private and public institutions,
those not rooted in businesses, professional or occupational member-
ships, or the constituencies of existing government agencies and pro-
grams. "43 He speculates that this, in turn, will lead to an
intensification of group-centered politics and a decreased "depen-
dence on stable public and private institutions."
The Longer Term
One of the first newspaper accounts of the (then still experimental)
medium oftelevision declared that it was a passing fad that would hold
little interest for most Americans and have little long-term impact.
Given the poor quality of television's sound, image, and content at
that time, it is not hard to see why an observer might draw this conclu-
sion. In many ways the Internet oftoday is analogous to that flickering
image of more than a half century ago, and predictions about its
impact are just as likely to fail the test of time.
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Nonetheless, the preliminary evidence, subject to many caveats, is
that the Internet is already having an impact on the political knowl-
edge levels ofcitizens who actively use the medium to gather informa-
tion. This impact is strongest among citizens who are most motivated
and able, raising the possibility of (but in no way ensuring) growing
divides between information haves and have-nots. There is little evi-
dence to suggest an increasingly fragmented citizenry divided into dis-
tinct "information publics." Evidence that the Internet will increase
civic engagement is also sparse, though specific examples of its value
in mobilizing small but intense segments of the public is suggestive of
its potential in this regard.
But it is far too early to know if these partial findings represent a
passing stage in the Internet's political development or the beginnings
ofwhat will become stronger and more lasting trends. What is clear is
that the Internet itselfwill change. Undoubtedly there will be a con-
vergence between television (and other media) and the Internet. Min-
iaturization of hardware, growing sophistication of software, and
increased bandwidth into the home carry with them several implica-
tions. First, it will be ergonomically much easier to spend time on the
Internet than it currently is. Citizens will be able to get the full func-
tionality of the Internet from their couches or easy chairs, with the
television serving as a computer monitor and a television simultane-
ously. Small, comfortable, book-like devices will bring the functional-
ity of television and the Internet to the lap. Thus, one important
disincentive to Internet use will be removed. Second, convergence
means that whatever we call news will increasingly combine the quali-
ties of television, newspapers, and the Web. News shows undoubtedly
will continue to be created with many of the same production values
they have today. But newscasts, like virtually all other programming,
will be available on demand and can be stopped and started at the con-
venience of the viewer. Many viewers will still want to watch an entire
newscast, but a menu will be available (as with today's DVD>movies)
from which stories can be chosen. These systems will also provide the
kind oftext-based resources we currently enjoy on the Web. Searching
for information will get easier and be more likely to return what the
seeker is looking for. .
These changes will mean that citizens can dig deeper ifthey choose
to do so and that it will take fewer cognitiveresources to be successful
in a search; it will also mean that citizens can avoid news more readily
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than in the present. The political impact ofthese changes will continue
to depend on the ability and motivation of citizens, coupled with the
radically transformed opportunities to learn and to translate this
knowledge into action. In turn, this ability, motivation, and opportu-
nity will depend as much as on the content and context of this new
information environment as on the technology itself. And as always,
this is ultimately a question of political choice, power, and imagina-
tion.
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